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Building on the recent finding that agency experiences do not merely rely on
sensorimotor information but also on cognitive cues, this exploratory study uses
electroencephalographic recordings to examine functional connectivity during agency
inference processing in a setting where action and outcome are independent. Participants
completed a computerized task in which they pressed a button followed by one of two
color words (red or blue) and rated their experienced agency over producing the color.
Before executing the action, a matching or mismatching color word was pre-activated
by explicitly instructing participants to produce the color (goal condition) or by briefly
presenting the color word (prime condition). In both conditions, experienced agency was
higher in matching vs. mismatching trials. Furthermore, increased electroencephalography
(EEG)-based connectivity strength was observed between parietal and frontal nodes and
within the (pre)frontal cortex when color-outcomes matched with goals and participants
reported high agency. This pattern of increased connectivity was not identified in trials
where outcomes were pre-activated through primes. These results suggest that different
connections are involved in the experience and in the loss of agency, as well as in
inferences of agency resulting from different types of pre-activation. Moreover, the
findings provide novel support for the involvement of a fronto-parietal network in agency
inferences.
Keywords: sense of agency, inferences, phase synchronization, EEG, connectivity, goal-directed processes,
outcome priming
INTRODUCTION
Humans generally feel in control of their actions and the events
that follow from them. This sense of agency plays a key role
in self-awareness as well as social interaction (Haggard and
Tsakiris, 2009; Ruys and Aarts, 2012). Although experiences of
self-agency arise naturally in most individuals, abnormalities in
agency processing, such as feeling in control over externally gener-
ated outcomes, or, oppositely, experiencing a loss of control over
outcomes that one did produce, have been observed in a vari-
ety of psychiatric and neurological disorders (Blakemore et al.,
2002). Examining the neural substrates underlying self-agency in
the healthy brain thus is an important step to comprehend the
origin of disturbed agency experiences, and eventually uncover
possible ways to alleviate them.
The experience of agency has primarily been studied from
the perspective of comparator models that are part of the motor
control system (Frith et al., 2000). These models often rely on
paradigms in which visual, tactile, or auditory feedback of the
participants’ action is manipulated (e.g., Sperduti et al., 2011;
David, 2012). According to the comparator model, the execution
of an action is accompanied by the prediction of sensory action-
outcomes based on internal copies of movement-predicting sig-
nals (i.e., efference copies) generated by the motor system.
Because internal motor predictions are generally fast and reliable,
sensory outcomes are readily perceived as self-produced when
these predictions correspond with the actual outcome (Frith et al.,
2000). This motor prediction process of agency has been found
to be associated with brain activity in various areas, including
the superior temporal gyrus, the inferior parietal lobe, as well as
motor regions such as the pre-supplementary motor area and the
cerebellum (for an overview, see Sperduti et al., 2011).
According to the comparator model, experiences of agency
are less likely to occur when the motor system cannot pro-
duce an efference copy (i.e., when acts are not self-generated)
or when these signals are weak or noisy, such as when there
is no clear causal relationship between an action and an effect.
However, recent research has demonstrated that people can
feel in control over externally generated events (Wegner et al.,
2004) and in the absence of high action-effect contingency
(Moore et al., 2009; Van der Weiden et al., 2011). These find-
ings strongly suggest that agency experiences can also emerge via
a different route. This alternative route, specified by the infer-
ence model, involves cognitive inferences of the correspondence
between action outcomes and prior activation of information
about the outcome (Wegner, 2002). Despite the role of these
inference processes in the emergence of agency (Moore et al.,
2009; Sato, 2009; see also Synofzik et al., 2008, 2013), their neu-
ral basis has hitherto received relatively little empirical attention.
Another issue that remains unclear from prior work is how brain
regions associated with agency interact and exert influence over
each other. The present study builds on recent advancement
in the quantification of neural communication to examine
the interactions between cortical regions during inferences of
agency.
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AGENCY INFERENCES
The inference model proposes that upon observing an event, peo-
ple determine whether or not it has resulted from their actions
by comparing the outcome with prior activated information or
thoughts about action-effects. If there is a match, they ascribe the
action-outcome to themselves, whereas, in case of a mismatch,
the effect is ascribed to an external cause. Although this account
involves a predictive element regarding action-outcomes similar
to the comparator model, the prior expectations specified in this
model only minimally depend on motor signals. Instead, these
expectations pertain to cognitive priors such as intentions and
beliefs (Synofzik et al., 2013). Moreover, even though predictive
elements are involved in inference processes, the critical informa-
tion is provided by the action outcome (Synofzik et al., 2013).
It is important to note that inferences of agency are normally
thought to result from intentions. That is, if an intention to pro-
duce a certain outcome matches the actual sensory consequences
following one’s action, people tend to experience causal responsi-
bility for these consequences, whereas if the intentionmismatches
with the observed outcome, a reduced sense of agency is experi-
enced (Wegner, 2002). Intriguingly, however, recent research sug-
gests that prior knowledge regarding action outcomes does not
necessarily need to be explicitly activated for agency inferences
to occur, but can also consist of outcome primes as a source of
agency (Aarts et al., 2005; Linser and Goschke, 2007; Jones et al.,
2008; Belayachi and van der Linden, 2010; Dannenberg et al.,
2012; Ruys and Aarts, 2012). This evidence possibly accounts
for the emergence of experienced agency in everyday situations
where people do not produce action-outcomes themselves or lack
awareness of the actual causes of their behavior.
Although goals and primes give rise to similar inferences of
agency, there is some preliminary evidence to suggest that the two
sources produce qualitatively different effects (Van der Weiden
et al., 2013). Specifically, pursuing a goal instigates a control pro-
cess that causes people to focus on the specific outcome one
wants to reach and, at the same time, to inhibit all other possi-
ble outcomes (Fishbach and Ferguson, 2007; Förster et al., 2007;
Aarts, 2012). Consequently, inference processes based on goals
are very specific and reliable in the detection of deviations from
intended outcomes. These goal-directed control processes are
less likely to occur in case of outcome priming, because out-
come priming is assumed to merely enhance the accessibility
of the outcome representations and other information associ-
ated with it (Van der Weiden et al., 2013). This implies that
agency inferences based on priming are less sensitive to devia-
tions and hence have a noisier processing mechanism than goal-
directed processes (Van der Weiden et al., 2013). Based on these
qualitative differences between inferences resulting from goals
and primes, we not only examined the neural communication
between cortical regions underlying goal-based inferences but,
for exploratory purposes, also investigated these neural processes
during prime-based inferences.
NEURAL COMMUNICATION AND AGENCY INFERENCES
Cognitive functioning, including inferences of agency, is depen-
dent on the integration of information within and between
functionally specialized brain sites (Varela et al., 2001; Stam and
van Straaten, 2012a). There is increasing agreement that this
integration, or more precisely, the communication between neu-
rons, arises from synchronization of neural activity (Salinas and
Sejnowski, 2001; Varela et al., 2001; Buzsáki and Draguhn, 2004;
Fries, 2005; Schnitzler and Gross, 2005; Sauseng and Klimesch,
2008). Specifically, neurons’ responsiveness has the property to
oscillate, referring to fluctuations in excitability of their mem-
brane potential (Buzsáki and Draguhn, 2004). These fluctuations
create time windows in which a neuron is most responsive to sig-
nals by other neurons (Buzsáki and Draguhn, 2004). Hence, for
two neurons to successfully exchange information, their excitabil-
ity period needs to be aligned, which happens whenever they
oscillate in phase (Buzsáki and Draguhn, 2004; Fries, 2005). In
contrast, when phase synchronization between the oscillations of
two neurons is absent, their communication is inhibited (Fries,
2005). Accordingly, the neural networks underlying agency pro-
cessing can be studied by examining the synchronization of neural
activity, and thus the exchange of information between local and
distant groups of neurons (Varela et al., 2001).
Two recent studies using functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) have provided some insights into the neural networks
underlying agency processing. In one study, participants were
asked to indicate perceived control over actions based on con-
gruent or incongruent movement feedback (David et al., 2007).
Increased connectivity was observed between the pre-motor
cortex, cerebellum, and posterior parietal cortex (PPC) when
movements were correctly identified as externally generated, and
between the insula and somatosensory cortex when movements
were correctly classified as self-generated (David et al., 2007;
David, 2012). In another study, leading and lagging networks
were identified during experiences of loss of control in response
to incongruent visual feedback (Nahab et al., 2011). The lead-
ing network consisted, among others, of the inferior parietal lobe
and the insula and was shown to send information to a lag-
ging network consisting of several areas in the posterior parietal
and prefrontal lobe. The authors interpreted the leading network
as being involved in the comparison of motor predictions with
actual effects, whereas the lagging network (in particular the pre-
frontal lobe) was thought to be responsible for the translation of
the outcome of this comparison into higher order processing of
agency, such as the conscious awareness of this experience.
Although the aforementioned connectivity studies provide
a first glimpse into neural networks underlying experiences of
agency and to the direction of information flow between them,
they deal with agency processes informed by motor predic-
tive signals, and not by cognitive inferences processes per se. A
recent fMRI study addressed this notion by examining the neu-
ral substrates of goal-based agency inferences (Renes et al., 2013).
During the ascription of outcomes to oneself, activation was
observed in the inferior parietal lobe, the superior frontal cortex
and the medial prefrontal cortex, implying that the lagging net-
work identified by Nahab et al. (2011) might indeed be involved
in the previously mentioned higher order agency processing.
THE PRESENT STUDY
In the present study we further examine and extend these findings
by analyzing the pattern of information flow during inferences
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of agency using measures of (directed) phase synchronization. By
doing so, we not only build on recent calls for a shift from localiza-
tion to network perspectives on agency processing (David, 2012),
but also expand prior work on the connectivity underlying the
sense of agency by employing a more direct measure of neural
communication.
To explore the cortical interactions underlying inferences of
agency we used an action-outcome task in which participants per-
form an action (pressing a key) that is followed by a sensory effect
(the color word red or blue presented on the computer screen)
that either matches or mismatches with pre-activated knowl-
edge of this outcome. After observing the outcome, self-agency
over producing the outcome is reported. Importantly, partici-
pants learn that the outcome they observe is not always caused by
their actions but can be determined by the computer as well. As
a consequence, sensorimotor predictive processes are unreliable
in this task, allowing us to pinpoint agency experiences that are
informed by inferences. Furthermore, pre-activation of knowl-
edge about outcomes inmanipulated by explicitly instructed goals
to produce the outcome or by briefly presented primes of the
outcome, thus allowing us to study goal-based and prime-based
agency inferences.
To examine the neural communication of agency inferences
we used the electroencephalogram (EEG), which has a tempo-
ral resolution that is sufficient to non-invasively examine phase
synchronization (Sauseng and Klimesch, 2008; Stam and van
Straaten, 2012a). Based on prior work we are particularly inter-
ested in coupling strength between parietal and frontal regions
and the direction of information flow between them.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty right-handed participants (Mage = 21.03, SDage = 3.20;
22 females) who indicated no current neurological condition,
mental illness or use of psychiatric medication took part in the
experiment. Participants were asked to refrain from the consump-
tion of caffeine 3 hours prior to the experiment. All participants
received course credit or a monetary reward in exchange for their
participation. The study received approval from our internal fac-
ulty board (Social and Behavioral Sciences) at Utrecht University.
Furthermore, written informed consent of each participant was
obtained.
AGENCY INFERENCE TASK
The agency inference task was adapted from Renes and Aarts
(in preparation). Similar to playing a slot machine, this task
required participants to stop a sequence of rapidly presented
information to produce a particular outcome (i.e., the color word
red or blue) on the computer screen. Specifically, participants
pressed a key in response to a cue while viewing alternating letter
strings. Upon pressing this key, the stream of letter strings stopped
and the color word “red” or “blue” was presented. This outcome
could either match or mismatch with prior knowledge regard-
ing the action-effect (i.e., goals or outcome primes; see below).
In addition, participants learned that the computer could have
caused the presented outcome as well. In other words, the cause of
the observed effect was ambiguous (Aarts et al., 2005; Sato, 2009).
After viewing the sensory effect following their key press, par-
ticipants reported experienced agency over causing the perceived
effect.
Each trial consisted of five different phases: an exposure phase,
a filler interval, an action phase, an outcome phase and a rating
phase (see Figure 1). The last four phases were identical for all
trials. During the filler interval, participants attended to rapidly
alternating letter strings. This interval served as a delay between
exposure to pre-activated information and the action that was
also present in previous work on agency inferences (e.g., Van der
Weiden et al., 2013). In the action phase, participants responded
to a circle (the letter “o” presented in Arial 24 pt. at an approxi-
mate visual angle of 2.10◦) that appeared above or below the letter
FIGURE 1 | Schematic presentation of a match trial in the agency
inference task for the goal condition and the prime condition. Both goal
and prime trials start with the pre-activation of a color word that is presented
within a stream of letter strings. In the goal trials participants are instructed to
produce this outcome. In the prime trials participants are merely exposed to
the prime words. After a short interval participants press a key in response to
an action cue appearing above or below the letter strings. Upon this key
press the stream of information stops and a color word matching or
mismatching the pre-activated word is presented. Participants are asked to
report experienced self-agency over this outcome.
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strings, by pressing the corresponding upper or lower key on a
response box with their right index finger. This action cue was
included to ensure that participants paid attention to the outcome
prime or goal presented amidst of the letter strings. The interval
in which a response could be given lasted 800ms. If participants
pressed the key within this interval, the strings continued to alter-
nate until the end of a 960ms lasting interval, whereas if they
pressed too late, an error message occurred and the trial was
processed as missing.
Following the action phase, the color word “red” or “blue”
(counterbalanced between trials) was shown for 1500ms, after a
short delay of 120ms. To ensure that participants would maintain
looking at the letter strings, participants were told that pressing
the key during the presentation of a string containing the letter R
(e.g., MWRT) would cause the word “red” to appear, whereas a
key press during the presentation of a string containing the letter
“B” (e.g., BTSZW) was followed by the word “blue.” In reality, the
computer determined the presentation of color words.
After each trial, experienced agency was assessed during a rat-
ing phase by asking participants to what extent they felt their
key press caused the presented color word to occur. They could
respond by moving a square on a 9-point analog scale ranging
from the Dutch word “niet” (in this context roughly correspond-
ing to: “Not at all” to “wel” (“Very much”). The square had to be
moved at least one position to the left or the right of the scale,
starting in the center (i.e., answer “5”). This caused the data to
consist of split responses (i.e., data ranging from 1 to 4 and 6 to
9). In order to form a continuous scale ranging from 1 to 8, the
agency ratings were recoded (i.e., 9 = 8, 8 = 7, 7 = 6, and 6 = 5).
Pre-activated knowledge about outcomes
As mentioned earlier, the exposure phase was not identical for all
trials. Specifically, in this phase knowledge regarding the outcome
was activated by either goals or by primes.
In goal trials, participants were exposed to a series of let-
ter strings followed by a color word that was clearly presented
on the screen for 240ms. This sequence was repeated twice (see
Figure 1), using the same color word. Participants were instructed
to form the goal to produce the color word that appeared within
the series of letter strings.
In outcome prime trials, participants viewed five random letter
strings followed by a briefly presented color word (40ms). This
sequence of events was repeated eight times, resulting in a total
of eight identical primes during a 1920ms period (see Figure 1).
Importantly, participants were not instructed to formulate a goal
in the prime trials.
Note that, in contrast to prior studies (Van der Weiden et al.,
2013), the duration and moment of the exposure phase was
identical for both types of pre-activated outcome information.
Accordingly, differences between prime and goal based inferences
could be examined in a more controlled manner.
The goal trials and outcome prime trials were presented in two
separated blocks which each consisted of 64 randomly presented
trials. All participants started with the prime condition to prevent
transference of instructions from the goal condition to the prime
condition (i.e., to prevent participants from using the primed
information to form a goal). In half of the trials, pre-activated
color words corresponded with the actual outcome, whereas in
the other half of the trials they did not correspond with this out-
come. Participants practiced for both blocks before the onset of
the experiment (eight trials per practice block). After completing
these practice trials participants completed the outcome-priming
block, followed by a practice block for the goal condition (four
trials) and the actual goal block. In between the two blocks par-
ticipants were allowed to have a break. In addition, participants
paused for 30 s after completing the first half (i.e., 32 trials) of
each block.
EEG RECORDING AND PRE-PROCESSING
EEG was recorded at a sampling rate of 2048Hz during the entire
agency inference task from 32 electrodes positioned according to
the international 10/20 system using the BioSemi Active Two EEG
system (BioSemi). The Electro-oculogram (EOG) was measured
from electrodes placed on the suborbit and supraorbit of the right
eye and on the outer canthi of both eyes. Raw EEG data was band
pass filtered offline (0.5–50Hz) with a roll-off of 48 dB/oct and a
50Hz Notch filter. Time series were re-referenced against an aver-
age reference. In order to correct for eye movements, Gratton and
Cole’s method (Gratton et al., 1983) was used. A semi-automated
artifact correction tool (Brain Vision Analyzer software package;
Version 2.0), allowing a maximum difference of 50μV/ms, was
employed to detect further artifacts. The corrected data was chun-
ked down to 128 trial-specific segments that started at the onset
of the outcome presentation and ended after 1000ms. This time
window corresponds to the interval of interest used in prior work
on the neural basis of agency inferences (Renes et al., 2013).
FUNCTIONAL CONNECTIVITY
EEG was employed to assess both bidirectional and directional
neural communication during agency inferences; quantified by
the phase lag index (PLI; Stam et al., 2007) and directed phase
lag index (dPLI; Stam and van Straaten, 2012b) respectively.
Phase lag index
The PLI identifies statistical interdependency of two time series
based on the level of asymmetry of the distribution of their phase
differences (for mathematical details see Stam et al., 2007). Since
the PLI only reflects correlations between signals of which the
phase difference deviates from zero, it is less affected by common
source problems and amplitude changes than other connectivity
measures (however, see Muthukumaraswamy and Singh, 2011).
The PLI ranges from 0 to 1, with a score of zero indicating no
coupling or coupling that might result from common source
problems, and a score of 1 indicating perfect coupling.
BRAINWAVE software (version 9.75) was used to compute
the instantaneous phase (using a Hilbert transformation) and
PLI between all pairs of electrodes for each trial in the broad-
band (2–50Hz), delta band (2–4Hz), theta band (4–8Hz), alpha
band (8–12Hz), beta band (13–30Hz), and gamma band (30–
40Hz). By doing so, trial specific 32 × 32 connectivity matrices
were created. Given that the present study aims to examine func-
tional connectivity associated with agency experiences emerging
from inferences, rather than connectivity as a function of task
conditions, we decided to examine the low vs. high agency
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contrast within each task condition (i.e., as a function of match-
ing and type of pre-activation). In line with prior research (Renes
et al., 2013), the aforementioned 32 × 32 trial matrices were
sorted into two groups based on agency ratings (Low agency: rat-
ing ≤ 4, High agency: rating ≥ 5). The frequency distributions of
agency ratings for matching and pre-activation cells are presented
in Supplementary Figure S1. To allow for group comparison, aver-
agematrices were created for each possible combination of type of
pre-activation, matching and level of agency. This resulted in eight
average 3D group matrices comprising PLI values for all possible
pairs of electrodes per participant.
Nonparametric permutation tests adapted from Boersma et al.
(2013) were used to test for differences in PLI for all possible
electrode pairs between low agency and high agency for match
and mismatching conditions (i.e., low agency vs. high agency
for goals matching the outcome, low agency vs. high agency for
goals mismatching the outcome, low agency vs. high agency for
primes matching the outcome and low agency vs. high agency for
primes mismatching the outcome). These tests involved a resam-
pling method with replacement, which was used to generate ten
thousand random pairs of groups from the two originally speci-
fied observations (i.e., low and high agency), across participants1.
By comparing the mean PLI values for all electrode pairs between
these random groups, a distribution of differences for all pairwise
connections was created. The position of the original differ-
ence value in this distribution was used to determine p-values
for each contrast. Significant differences (alpha = 0.05) were
visualized using a modified version of the topoplot function in
the EEGlab toolbox (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). Specifically,
networks were plotted in which each node is represented by an
EEG electrode and the links between the nodes correspond to
a significant difference in connectivity between low and high
agency.
Directed phase lag index
dPLIs were calculated to examine the direction of information
flow of pairwise connections. Similar to the PLI the dPLI is a
measure of the asymmetry of the distribution of phase differ-
ences of two signals (Stam and van Straaten, 2012b). However,
dPLI also assesses the direction of the asymmetry (i.e., the prob-
ability that the phase of the signal measured at electrode X is
smaller than the phase of the signal measured at electrode Y),
whereas PLI merely determines the presence of absolute asymme-
try. The direction of the asymmetry allows one to infer whether
a signal recorded from a node is phase leading (i.e., sending
information) or phase lagging (i.e., receiving information) com-
pared to the signal recorded from all the other nodes (Stam and
van Straaten, 2012b). Specifically, time series measured from a
node with a dPLI score larger than 0.5 are thought to be lead-
ing in phase, whereas a dPLI score smaller than 0.5 indicates the
1The authors are aware that the within-subject nature of the data violates the
exchangeability assumption of the permutation tests and thus increases the
likelihood of false positives. However, given that the design of the study leads
to varying numbers of trials in the low and high agency condition (precluding
within-subject permutation), as well as our aspiration to visualize networks,
this analytical procedure was deemed most appropriate. Nevertheless, caution
is advised when interpreting the results.
opposite pattern (Stam and van Straaten, 2012b). In the present
study a modified version of the BRAINWAVE software (version
9.70) was used to assess directional connectivity between pairs of
nodes.
For each trial, dPLI matrices for all electrode pairs and aver-
age group matrices corresponding to each possible combination
of matching, type of pre-activation and agency were constructed.
These average matrices were used to obtain dPLI values for all
participants for each connection that significantly differed in
PLI between groups. Exploratory one-sample t-tests were used
to examine whether dPLI values of the connections significantly
differed from 0.5. Corrections for multiple comparisons were
made by means of Benjamini and Hochberg’s (1995) false dis-
covery rate procedure. These analyses were performed using SPSS
(version 20).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL DATA
Agency ratings
One hundred and eleven trials (2.89% of the total amount) were
excluded from the analyses due to the absence of a key press
within the interval of the action phase. Mean agency ratings
were calculated for matches and mismatches in the goal trials
and in the prime trials. Visual inspection of the data as well as
normality tests indicated non-normality of the data. However,
considering the robustness of ANOVA for these departures from
normality, we refrained from the use of non-parametric alter-
natives. The mean ratings were submitted to a 2 (type of pre-
activation: goal vs. prime) × 2 (matching: mismatch vs. match)
repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis yielded a main effect
of matching, F(1, 29) = 13.06, p = 0.001, η2ρ = 0.31, indicating
higher agency experiences when pre-activated outcome informa-
tion was consistent as opposed to inconsistent with the actual
outcome.Moreover, an interaction between type of pre-activation
and matching was observed, F(1, 29) = 5.39, p = 0.03, η2ρ = 0.16.
The main effect for type of pre-activation was not significant,
F(1, 29) = 1.25, p = 0.27, η2ρ = 0.04.
To gain further insight into the interaction, simple main
effects using Bonferroni correction (corrected alpha = 0.0125)
were calculated. These analyses yielded higher agency ratings
for matching vs. mismatching in both the goal, F(1, 29) = 11.36,
p = 0.002, η2ρ = 0.28, and outcome priming condition F(1, 29) =
10.74, p = 0.003, η2ρ = 0.27. A marginally significant simple
main effect of type of pre-activation was observed within match
trials, F(1, 29) = 6.66, p = 0.02, η2ρ = 0.19, but not in mismatch
trials, F(1, 29) = 2.22, p = 0.15, η2ρ = 0.07. The means of the cells
are depicted in Figure 2.
Key-press reaction times
To check whether participants responded differently to the action
cue by pressing the key as a function of the type of trial, mean
reaction times were submitted to a 2 (type of pre-activation:
goal vs. prime) × 2 (matching: mismatch vs. match) repeated
measures ANOVA. This analysis yielded a non-significant main
effect of type of pre-activation, F(1, 29) = 2.68, p = 0.11, η2ρ =
0.09, indicating no difference in reaction time between goal trials
(M = 436.25, SE = 11.85) and prime trials (M = 449.28, SE =
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FIGURE 2 | Reported experience of agency as a function of type of
pre-activation and matching. The numbers above the bars represent the
mean and standard error (also reflected by the error bars) of the
corresponding condition.
9.75). In addition, no difference in reaction time was observed
between match (M = 445.43, SE = 9.77) and mismatch trials
(M = 440.10, SE = 10.69), as evidenced by a non-significant
main effect of matching, F(1, 29) = 2.38, p = 0.13, η2ρ = 0.08.
Finally, the interaction effect between type of pre-activation and
matching was not significant, F(1, 29) = 0.05, p = 0.83, η2ρ =
0.002.
Agency rating times
The time participants took to report experienced agency was
also assessed by submitting mean rating times (in milliseconds)
to a 2 (type of pre-activation: goal vs. primes) × 2 (match-
ing: mismatch vs. match) repeated measures ANOVA. Although
the data was non-normally distributed, we refrained from using
non-parametric alternatives for previously mentioned reasons.
Participants reported experienced agency faster in goal tri-
als (M = 1470.69, SE = 129.57) than in prime trials (M =
1669.35, SE = 131.58), F(1, 29) = 6.51, p = 0.02, η2ρ = 0.18. The
differences in reaction time between mismatch trials (M =
1554.70, SE = 122.13) and match trials (M = 1585.33, SE =
130.79), F(1, 29) = 0.49, p = 0.49, η2ρ = 0.02, as well as the
interaction effect between type of pre-activation and matching,
F(1, 29) = 1.95, p = 0.17, η2ρ = 0.06, were non-significant.
In short, the behavioral data shows two notable findings.
First, participants report higher agency experiences when the
observed effect matches vs. mismatches with pre-activated out-
come information. This effect tends to be more pronounced in
case of goal-based agency inferences than in case of prime-based
agency inferences. Moreover, participants provided faster ratings
concerning their feeling of agency in goal trials as opposed to
prime trials.
EEG DATA
Data exclusion
Visual data inspection led to the detection of noisy data on one
or more channels for five participants. These participants were
excluded from further EEG analyses to retain the option of ana-
lyzing all 32 × 32 channel pairs. In addition, four participants had
no trials left in one or more cells that were created by splitting the
data in low and high agency ratings; these participants were also
excluded. Hence, the total sample for EEG analysis consisted of 21
participants (Mage = 21.43, SDage = 3.37; 17 females). In addi-
tion, 1.67% of the trials were excluded based on semi-automated
visual artifact rejection. Finally, trials that were characterized as
missing in the agency inference task (i.e., trials in which the key
was not pressed within the action interval) were omitted from
analyses (2.75%)2.
Connectivity
Figure 3 provides an overview of connectivity for the contrast
between low and high agency as a function of matching and type
of pre-activation. Re-running the permutation analyses can result
in marginal variation in the null distribution of mean differences.
As a result, inclusion of connections with PLI differences near
the significance threshold (alpha = 0.05; two-tailed) is subject to
similar variation. Dashed lines (0.02 ≤ p ≤ 0.03) are used to dis-
criminate these connections from those that are more robust over
different runs (i.e., solid lines; p < 0.02).
Goal trials. The behavioral data suggests that people experience
more self-agency when a goal matches the observed outcome vs.
when it does not. In other words, matches are more likely to
be associated with high agency, whereas mismatches are associ-
ated with low agency3. When examining connectivity associated
with high agency (vs. low agency) experiences in trials in which
goals match with the outcome (Figure 3), increased connectivity
is observed between parietal and frontal regions as well as within
the frontal cortices in the broadband. With regard to specific fre-
quency bands, high agency experiences during match trials seem
particularly governed by increased connectivity in the beta band.
Different connections emerge during low-agency experiences
in trials in which goals mismatch with the outcome. Specifically,
in the broadband frequency increased connectivity for low agency
experiences (compared to high agency experiences) is observed
within and between parietal and frontal areas. In addition, this
increased connectivity can particularly be observed in alpha and
gamma bands.
Prime trials. During experiences of high agency (vs. low agency)
in trials in which primesmatch with the observed effect, increased
connectivity can be observed between parietal and frontal regions
2Although the analyses of behavioral data and EEG data differ (in the
sense that different contrasts are assessed), we checked whether the reported
findings for behavioral data change when excluding the artifact trials and par-
ticipants that are excluded from the EEG analysis. The repeated measures
ANOVA yielded a main effect of matching, F(1, 20) = 8.36, p = 0.009, η2ρ =
0.29, showing that matching outcomes corresponded with higher agency
experiences than mismatching outcomes. The main effect of type of pre-
activation, F(1, 20) = 0.02, p = 0.89, η2ρ = 0.001 and the interaction between
type of pre-activation andmatching, F(1, 20) = 1.27, p = 0.27, η2ρ = 0.06 were
not significant.
3Note that the behavioral data indicates that participants sometimes report
low agency in a match trial and high agency in a mismatch trial. These
experiences, and corresponding connectivity, are not likely to reflect agency
processes emerging from prime-based or goal-based inferences—and are thus
not explicitly discussed in the result section.
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FIGURE 3 | Significant differences in PLI between low and high
agency as a function of matching and type of pre-activation
across frequency bands. Red lines indicate that PLI low agency
> PLI high agency, whereas blue lines represents the opposite
pattern. Dashed lines represent PLI differences near the
significance threshold (0.02 ≤ p ≤ 0.03) whereas solid lines represent
connections that are more robust across re-runs of the
permutation analysis (p < 0.02).
in the broadband. Increased fronto-parietal connectivity is also
present to a larger extent in the delta, theta, alpha, and beta band.
Reports of low agency (as opposed to high agency) dur-
ing primed mismatch trials are associated with enhanced cou-
pling between parietal and frontal areas. With regard to specific
frequency bands, increased connectivity between parietal, and
frontal regions during experiences of low agency (vs. high agency)
is especially apparent in the delta band.
Direction of information flow
The connectivity pattern that was observed in the broadband
during high agency experiences in trials in which goals matched
action-effects, is in line with previous findings on the neural basis
of agency (e.g., Nahab et al., 2011). To explore whether the infor-
mation flow between the identified nodes is also consistent with
prior work (i.e., directed from parietal to frontal lobes), directed
phase lag indices were calculated for all conditions in this fre-
quency range (see Table 1 for mean PLI values). As can be seen
in Table 2, the signal measured from the left parietal electrode is
leading in phase compared to the signal at the left frontal elec-
trode in trials in which goals match the outcome, suggesting that
there is a trend of anteriorly directed information flow in these tri-
als. In the other conditions no clear direction of information flow
could be observed. It should be noted that the reported effects are
not corrected for multiple comparisons. After implementing this
correction, none of the dPLI values were different from 0.5 at the
conventional significance level of p < 0.05.
DISCUSSION
Building on recent interest in neural networks underlying agency
processing (David, 2012), the present study examined cortical
information flow during inferences of agency. Whereas some
insights into the networks underlying agency processing have
been provided by previous studies employing fMRI (David et al.,
2007; Nahab et al., 2011), here we offered a first attempt to
investigate this connectivity by tapping into the mechanism
that is proposed to underlie neural communication (i.e., phase
synchronization).
The role of inference processes in self-agency experiences is
supported by the current behavioral data. In line with the infer-
ence model (Wegner, 2002) and previous work (Wegner and
Wheatley, 1999; Aarts et al., 2005; Van der Weiden et al., 2011,
2013), participants reported higher agency experiences when pre-
activated knowledge was congruent vs. incongruent with actual
outcomes. Importantly, these results cannot be easily accounted
for by the comparator account, as predictive motor processes
were unreliable (or even absent) due to the experimental set-up.
Specifically, there was no causal relation between the key press of
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Table 1 | Mean PLI during high (HA) and low experiences of agency
(LA) in trials in which (A) goals matched the outcomes, (B) goals
mismatched the outcomes, (C) primes matched the outcomes, and
(D) primes mismatched the outcomes in broadband frequency.
Connection PLI (LA) PLI (HA)
M SD M SD
(A)
PO3_FC1 0.18 0.04 0.15 0.03
FC1_F7 0.16 0.04 0.14 0.03
P7_F7 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.03
F7_AF4 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.04
FC5_FP1 0.12 0.03 0.14 0.03
FC5_FP2 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.03
FC5_AF4 0.11 0.04 0.14 0.03
F7_FP1 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.04
CP6_Fz 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.02
(B)
PO4_Fz 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.03
PO3_FC1 0.15 0.04 0.12 0.04
P4_FC1 0.16 0.03 0.13 0.04
CP2_F3 0.16 0.03 0.13 0.04
F3_F7 0.15 0.04 0.12 0.04
P8_F8 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.05
CP1_FC1 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.03
(C)
PO4_CP6 0.16 0.03 0.13 0.03
CP6_FC2 0.17 0.04 0.14 0.03
CP6_F4 0.16 0.05 0.13 0.03
CP2_FP1 0.14 0.04 0.11 0.03
CP2_CP5 0.16 0.03 0.14 0.02
CP5_F3 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.04
CP5_AF3 0.15 0.04 0.12 0.03
CP1_FC2 0.14 0.02 0.16 0.03
(D)
CP2_FC1 0.16 0.03 0.14 0.03
CP6_FC2 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.03
PO4_FC1 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.04
FC2_AF4 0.13 0.03 0.15 0.04
Only connections between parietal and frontal electrodes (based on positions in
the international 10/20 system) with robust significant PLI group differences are
shown (i.e., solid lines in Figure 3).
participants and the presentation of the outcome, which restricts
the motor system in its prediction of sensory action consequences
(Sato, 2009). Accordingly, the reported experiences of agency are
likely to be informed by cognitive inferences formed upon the
occurrence of the outcome.
The results of the EEG data provide insight into neural
connectivity underlying agency inferences during matches and
mismatches. Increased coupling between parietal and frontal
cortices, as well as within frontal areas, was identified in the
broadband during high agency experiences in trials in which out-
comes matched prior goals. These regions have been associated
with agency processing in general (David et al., 2008; Sperduti
Table 2 | Results of one-sample t-tests for dPLI values during high
(HA) and low experiences of agency (LA) in trials in which (A) goals
matched the outcomes, (B) goals mismatched the outcomes, (C)
primes matched the outcomes, and (D) primes mismatched the
outcomes in broadband frequency.
Connection t p Direction
effect
(A)
LA_PO3_FC1 −0.21 0.83 –
LA_FC1_F7 −0.65 0.53 –
HA_P7_F7 2.46 0.02 ↑
HA_F7_AF4 2.11 0.05 ↑
HA_FC5_FP1 3.28 0.004 ↑
HA_FC5_FP2 3.23 0.004 ↑
HA_FC5_AF4 1.40 0.18 –
HA_F7_FP1 2.74 0.01 ↑
HA_CP6_Fz −1.09 0.29 –
(B)
LA_PO4_Fz −0.04 0.97 –
LA_PO3_FC1 −0.59 0.56 –
LA_P4_FC1 0.30 0.77 –
LA_CP2_F3 −0.13 0.90 –
LA_F3_F7 −0.81 0.43 –
HA_P8_F8 1.73 0.099 ↑
HA_CP1_FC1 0.37 0.72 –
(C)
LA_PO4_CP6 −0.53 0.60 –
LA_CP6_FC2 −2.89 0.009 ↓
LA_CP6_F4 −2.25 0.04 ↓
LA_CP2_FP1 −1.91 0.07 ↓
LA_CP2_CP5 2.02 0.06 ↑
LA_CP5_F3 −0.89 0.38 –
LA_CP5_AF3 0.15 0.88 –
HA_CP1_FC2 0.62 0.54 –
(D)
LA_CP2_FC1 −0.35 0.73 –
LA_CP6_FC2 −1.40 0.18 –
HA_PO4_FC1 0.09 0.93 –
HA_FC2_AF4 −1.16 0.26 –
Only connections between parietal and frontal electrodes (based on positions
in the international 10/20 system) with robust significant PLI group differences
are shown (i.e., solid lines in Figure 3). The arrows represent the direction of
the information flow between the two nodes (i.e., electrodes) specified in the
contrast. Upward arrows indicate that the first node is sending information to the
second node, whereas downward arrows indicate that the first node is receiving
information of the second node. Arrows are presented for p-values < 0.10.
et al., 2011) and agency inferences in particular (Renes et al.,
2013). The PPC has been implicated in the detection of con-
gruence between motor predictions and sensory action con-
sequences, and has mainly been activated during mismatches
(David, 2010). Nevertheless, Renes et al. (2013) have also iden-
tified activity in this region during matches, suggesting that
it might be involved in more general comparative processes
between outcome expectations and action-effects. Activity in
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 609 | 8
Dogge et al. Cortical interactions during agency inferences
prefrontal areas has been linked to a conscious monitoring
function (i.e., the conscious experience of having caused an
outcome or not; David, 2010). Although the observed fronto-
parietal connectivity concurs with this prior research, it is
important to note that observed connectivity during agency
inferences was not restricted to these areas, as can be seen in
Figure 3.
Connectivity between parietal and frontal areas in the broad-
band was also observed during low agency experiences in trials
in which goals mismatched with the outcome. Notably, however,
the coupling within frontal areas that was observed during high
agency in match trials was not detected during low agency experi-
ences in mismatch trials. A possible explanation for this finding is
that this frontal network is especially involved in the ascription of
outcomes to oneself as opposed to external sources. Some indirect
support for this idea comes from research on self-referential pro-
cessing showing increased activity of the medial prefrontal cortex
when participants judged personality traits as self-descriptive vs.
not self-relevant (Moran et al., 2006; Rameson et al., 2010).
This fits with our observation that the frontal network was not
involved in case of mismatching outcomes that were not ascribed
to oneself (i.e., that were deemed to be non-relevant).
Beyond the mere presence of increased coupling, a trend of
directionality pointing toward information flow from parietal
to frontal cortices was observed in the broadband during high
agency experiences following from outcomes matching goals.
This finding is in line with results by Nahab et al. (2011) who
speculated that the PPC serves as a low-level congruence detec-
tion network that transmits mismatch information to prefrontal
cortices in order to give rise to higher order agency processing
(i.e., a conscious experience of agency). Although this observation
is exciting, it is important to note that the observed directional-
ity in the current study was relatively weak (in terms of statistical
significance) and absent in trials in which goals mismatched the
actual outcome. That is, whereas increasing coupling between
parietal and frontal regions was observed during low agency expe-
riences in these trials, parietal nodes were not leading in phase
compared to frontal nodes. Therefore, interpretations with regard
to direction of information flow should be made with caution.
More generally, it is important to note that there is no unique
relationship between the time series recorded by EEG and their
underlying source, allowing only crude interpretations concern-
ing underlying brain regions. Importantly, however, the main
interest of the present study was to elucidate connectivity between
frontal and more posterior parts of the brain, rather than to relate
specific brain areas to agency inferences.
In addition to neural communication between cortical regions
in the broadband frequency, interactions in specific frequency
bands were assessed. Intriguingly, fronto-parietal connections
were present across frequency bands, while none of the bands
seemed particularly involved in agency inferences as a whole.
These observations might be attributable to the complex nature
of agency processing, in the sense that it encompasses functions
that have been related to specific bands, such as keeping out-
come representations active in working memory (associated with
theta band oscillations; Klimesch et al., 2005) and, in the case of
goal-based inferences, the prioritizing of top-down influence (i.e.,
goals) over novel events (associated with beta band oscillations;
Engel and Fries, 2010). Accordingly, the observed connectivity in
the variety of bands might be a reflection of the different dimen-
sions of the integration process involved in agency inferences
(Varela et al., 2001).
Recent findings suggest that agency experiences can result
from goal-based inferences as well as from primed-based infer-
ences (Van der Weiden et al., 2013). Based on these findings,
we examined the neural communication involved in both type
of agency inferences. When comparing connectivity patterns
between goals and primes in the broadband, frontal connec-
tions were observed during high agency experiences in trials
in which goals matched the outcome that were absent in trials
in which primes matched the outcome. Similarly, more fronto-
parietal coupling was observed in goal trials than in prime trials
during low agency experiences in mismatch trials. This general
decrease in connectivity associated with primes (vs. goals) might
be explained by differences in the process underlying the two
types of pre-activation (Van der Weiden et al., 2013). In contrast
to goals, mere priming of outcome information is not assumed
to install an attentional control process that maintains the spe-
cific outcome active in mind, while inhibiting other irrelevant
(but associated) items at hand. Therefore, the activation of the
outcome representation by priming (compared to goals) might
be more transient and less stable. The behavioral data provides
evidence for this notion. First, the difference in agency experi-
ences resulting from matches and mismatches tends to be more
predominantly expressed in goal trials than in prime trials. In
addition, participants were significantly faster to report expe-
rienced self-agency in the former (vs. the latter) trials. These
findings are in line with the notion that agency inferences occur-
ring via priming processes are less stable and noisier than goal-
based inferences, which may account for the reduced connectivity
associated with the former processes.
This line of reasoning might shed light onto the recent
observation that patients suffering from schizophrenia show spe-
cific disturbances in prime-based inferences processes whereas
their goal-based inferences seem intact (Renes et al., 2013).
Schizophrenia has been related to reduced structural connectiv-
ity between various brain regions, including reduced integrity
of white matter tracts connecting parietal and frontal nodes
(Ellison-Wright and Bullmore, 2009; Voineskos et al., 2010;
Whitford et al., 2011). Given that anatomical connections restrict
the functional networks that can be formed (Fries, 2005), agency
inferences that rest on fronto-parietal functional connectivity are
likely to be disturbed as well. The present study suggests that func-
tional connectivity related to prime-based inferences is weaker
compared to goal-based inferences. When taking into account
that only the prime-driven processes are disturbed in schizophre-
nia patients, it can be speculated that the relatively strong func-
tional connectivity pattern underlying inferences based on goals,
might allow schizophrenic patients to experience agency despite
decreased anatomical fronto-parietal connectivity. In contrast,
inferences based on primes are already associated with weaker
functional connectivity and accordingly might not be able to
overcome these structural abnormalities. However, the notion
that primed-based agency inferences are reduced in schizophrenic
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patients as a result of the quality of fronto-parietal anatomical
connectivity awaits further testing.
There are several methodological limitations that warrant con-
sideration when interpreting the present results. By examining
connectivity on the scalp we cannot exclude the possibility that
observed differences between conditions have been affected by
spontaneous and systematic changes of distant sources. That is,
due to the discontinuity PLI, noise induced by these sources can
shift phase leads to phase lags, which in turn might give rise
to spurious differences or, oppositely, mask real differences in
connectivity (Vinck et al., 2011). Future studies incorporating
source-localization procedures might provide additional insight
into the influence of distant sources. Another factor that might
affect PLI measurements is the number of trials used to estimate
this index. When this number is small, as in the current study, PLI
values tend to be overestimated, especially in case of small PLI val-
ues (Vinck et al., 2011). Note, however, that this overestimation
of PLI would be expected in both low and high agency condi-
tions. As such, the connectivity difference of interest is relatively
unaffected by this issue. A final confounding factor in the present
study is the multiple comparisons problem. Statistical analysis of
EEG data inherently copes with testing of condition effects at a
large number of pairs, across multiple frequency bands. Although
there are methods to correct for multiple testing, these meth-
ods are either overly conservative when a large number of tests
is conducted, or focused on networks rather than individual con-
nections. Given the exploratory aim of the present research, an
uncorrected comprehensive overview of connectivity is provided.
Accordingly, observed connectivity has to be interpreted with
some caution.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, we have demonstrated the potential of recent
methodological advances in the quantification of brain dynamics
to elucidate the neural basis underlying inferences of agency. In
particular, we were able to extend prior research that has mainly
focused on localized activation and provide preliminary support
for the existence of fronto-parietal interactions involved in send-
ing information from parietal to frontal areas to arrive at the
conscious experience of agency. By doing so, we hope that the
present results will encourage future research to move beyond
mere snapshots of the brain and to further explore the neural
networks underlying agentive self-awareness.
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